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NOTE .AND COMMENT
S~GUARDING 'l'~ CRn.IINAJ, Dtn:NDAN'l'.-Every now and then a new
attack is made somewhere in the United States upon the rule prohibiting
comment before the jury upon the fact that the defendant in a criminal
case has not testified as a witness in his own behalf. At the present time
an effort of this kind is being made in the Michigan legislature, and the
introduction of the bill drew quite a little storm of protest from the State
press as a dangerous inroad upon our ancient guarantees of personal liberty
and security. In fact, however, it directly touches nothing more ancient
than a statutory privilege which dates from the year 1861. By the Public
Acts of that year the disability of parties to actions to testify as witnesses
in this State was removed, but it was expressly provided that defendants in
criminal cases could not be compelled to testify, but might do so or not
at their own pleasure. (Act No. 125, §2). In 1881 an amendment to this
statute was passed providing, as to the defendant in a criminal case, that
"his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption against him, nor
sliall the court permit any reference or comment to be made to or upon such
neglect." (Pub. Acts, 1881, No. 245). And this is the form it retains in
the Judicature Act. (Ch. 17, ·§64).
Conceiving this statute to be merely a legislative interpretation of the
constitutional provision that "No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself' ·(Const. 1850, Art. VI, §32; Const.
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1909, Art. II, §16), the legislature is considering the proposal of a constitutional amendment to permit such comment. ,And this is probably necessary,
for judicial opinion seems to incline toward the view that comment upon a
failure .to testify is a violation of this provision against compulsory self' incrimination. CooLi>Y, CoNST. LIM~ (7th Ed.) 447; People v. Tyler, 36 Cal.
522; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555; Commonwealth v. Harlow, no Mass. 4II;
Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239. Only in Maine, it appears, has such
comment been expressly held to be compatible with this constitutional privilege. .State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217; State v. Banks, 78 Me. 490. The
New Jersey cases are not germane because in that State the constitution does
not have a similar provision. Parker v. State, 61 N. J~ L. 3o8.
The wisdom of the rule prohibiting comment upon a defendant's failure
to testify is a matter which may well be questioned. In the first place,
there is an artificiality and lack of candor in the ostrich-like refusal to
admit the existence of a perfectly obvious fact. As the Supreme Court of
New Jersey says, the inference which follows from a failure to testify "is
natural and irresistible. It will be drawn by honest jurymen, and no in"'
structions will prevent it. Must a court refrain from noticing that which
is so plain and forciible an indication of guilt?" Parker v. State, supra.
But a more serious objection is that the rule destroys a perfectly reliable
and legitimate means for aiding the jury to reach a just verdict. Fleehig
from arrest, giving contradictory or· improbable accounts of the matters in
issue, refusing to account for the possession of stolen property,-all these
are acts which suggest inferences as to guilt which are conceded to be
proper for the jury to consider. Conduct at the trial in refusing to give
testimony which could ordinarily be damaging only if the defendant were
· guilty, is an act equally suggestive of inference. If the co.nduct of the
defendant before the trial is available, why should his conduct at the trial
be deemed too dangerous and unjustly prejudicial for the jury to consider?
The rule evinces an astounding lack of confidence in the jury.
· This much is clear, that the rule hei;-e considered has nothing to do with
. due process of law, and is not guaranteed to the citizens of the several States
by the. United l'tates Constitution. It is at most a mere special application
of a more general rule, namely, against self-incrimination, and even this
latter rule is merely one of expediency and "has no place in the jurisprudence
of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the common law, and
it is nowhere observed among our own. people in the search for truth out~ide the administration of the law." Twining v. New Jersey, 2n U. S. 78,
n3. And it is also clear that in England and her colonies, where the
gull!'antees of ilie common law are helc\}n as high regard as with us, no
such rule as that prohibiting comment on failure to testify is recognized.
Regina v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q. B. 7i; Kops v. Regina [1894] App. Cas. New
South Wales, 650, affirming Id., 14 N. S. Wales L. Rep. 150.
It is also interesting to note that the large and iilfluential Law Reform
Coµimittee of the ,New York Bar Association, in a report made in Decen;tl>er, .I9~4. unanhnously, recommep.ded the enactment of legislation similar
fo that now proposed in the Michigan legislature.

NOTE AND COMMENT
A corollary to the rule against comment is involved in the recent and
much discussed case of Caminetti, et al. v. United States, 37 Sup. Ct. 192,
decided Jan. 15, 1917. In that case the defendant took the stand and testified
as to events up to a certain point, but he stopped short there and refused
to testify further. This failure to testify to subsequent events was put
before the jury by an instruction from the court as evidence for their
consideration. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that this was
error, under the federal statute (Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, c. 37}
which had been held to prohibit comment on·a failure to testify. Wilson v.
United States, 149 U. S. 6o. The Supreme Court of the United States held,
affirming th~ Circuit Court of Appeals below, that when the defendant took
the stand he voluntarily relinquished his privilege of silence together With
the immunity from comment thereon, and could not stop his testimony at
any point he saw fit "without subjecting his silence to the inferences to be
naturally drawn from it." The same point had previously been decided
the other way by two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. Balliet v.
United States, 129 Fed. 689, 64 C. C. A. 201; Myrick v. United States, 219
Fed. I, 134 C. C. A. 619. The decision in the Diggs case is in harmony
with the generally accepted view. W1GM0Rt, Evm., §2273(4), and note.

E. R. S.
TH!t ScoPt o:r' THt MANN Ac:t.-As was to be expected in view of the
well-settled doctrine of the Supreme Court that the constitutional grant
of power to regulate interstat~ commerce includes power of control over
transportation of persons as well as property, it was held in Hoke v. United
States,· 227 U. S. 3o8, 57 L. Ed. 523, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, that the WHITt
SI.Avt TRAFF'IC Ar!r of 1910 (36 Stat. 825), usually referred to as the MANN
Ac:t, was constitutional. State legislation covering the same ground, it
has been held, has :been displaced. State v. Harper, 48 Mont.456, 138 Pac. 495.
Wide differences as to the interpretation of the Ac:r early arose. That
commercialized vice was intended to be reached was indicated by the name
given to the ACT by Congress itself and by the report accompanying the
introduction of the Ac:r into the House of Representatives. This view seems
to have been adopted by Judge PoLU>CK in the United States District Court
in an unreported case. See 12 MICH. L. Rtv. 156. The terms of the ACT,
however, quite clearly do not so limit its operation. By §2 it is provided
"That any person who shall knowipgly transport or cause to be transported
* * * in interstate or foreign commerce * * * any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose
* * * shall be ·deemed guilty of a felony," etc. In three cases attracting
wide attention it was held that the offense was committed by transportation
of a woman in interstate commerce simply for the gratification of personal
desire and pleasure, no phase of commercialized vice being present. Johnson
v. United States, 215 Fed. 679, 131 C. C. A. 613; Diggs v. United States,
and Camilletti v. United States, 220 Fed. 545· The latter cases have been
recently affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice and Justices

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
:McKlwNA and

~.however,

dissenting. Caminetti, et al. v. United States,

37 Sup. Ct. zgz

Speaking of the interpretation of written law BI.ACKS'lON:t says, "As to
the efjects and consequence, the rule is, that where words bear either none,
or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little
deviate from the received sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law,
mentioned by PUI!.FtNDORJt, which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the
streets .should be punished with the utmost severity,'
held after long
debate not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that
fell down in the street with a fit." I Br.AcK. CoMM. *6o. "The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Pr.oWDSN, that the statute of First
Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty
of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison
is on fire; 'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.'
And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make,
that the Act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the
passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary
detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment
for murder." United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486. And in Church of
The Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, it was held that the importation by the accused of an ali~ under contract to serve as rector of
a church was not punishable under a; statute making it an offense to import
aliens "under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States,"
it being conceded that the act upon which the prosecution was based was
dearly included within the language of the statute. The dissenting Justices
in the principal case, being of opinion both from external and internal evidences that the legislative purpose was to cover only commercialized vice,
sought to apply the principle of these holdings. The complete blamelessness of the· physician, of the officer making the arrest of the mail carrier,
and of the church, in the instances referred to wonld seem to make out
a situation differi~g 'vitally from that of the defendant who has transported
a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of fornication or adultery.
To the argument that under the interpretation of the Ac:!r adopted by the
Supreme Court opportunities for blackmail may be vastly increased, it may
perhaps be suggested that even so the wholly innocent traveller has nothing
to fear. If a man in his peregrinations chooses to provide himself with
· feinale society to while away the tedious hours of travel it is not- entirely
unreasonable to expect him to assume such risks, even granting that relations between him and his companion may never actually have passed
beyond the purely platonic.
R. W. A.

was

Tn LIABIUTY oF -r11:e INI'rIAI. CAiuu£R AF'rr:R 'rHS FIN.AI. CABRIER Bsco:Mss
WABSHOUS:tMAN.-In England and a few of the United States the rule of
Muschamp v. Lancaster, etc., Ry. Co., 8 Mees. & W. 421, is followed, and
a carrier which receives goods for transportation to a point beyond its
terminus presumably assumes liability for through transportation. In most
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of the States a carrier may assume liability beyond its own line by making
a "through contract," but unless it does so the carrier receiving goods
destined for a point not ·on its line is liable only for safe carriage over its
own part of the route and for delivery to the succeeding carrier. As ·regards interstate transportation, Congress doubtless assumed complete control
over the matter by the CARMACK AMENDMENT of 1go6 (34 Stat. at L 584,
Ch. 3591) and provided therein that the initial carrier should be liable for
"any loss, damage or injury to such property caused by it" or any connecting
carrier. One of the results of the act referred to, as construed by the
United States Supreme Court in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226
U. S. 491, and other cases, was to make ·contracts limiting the carrier's
liability valid, regardless of State rules to the contrary; and the courts of
States whose laws had been more advantageous to the shipper were loath
to extend its operation any further than they were obliged to by the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. See IS MlcH L. Rr:v. 314 In like
manner, the courts of States whose laws were more advantageous to the
initial carrier have been reluctant to extend the effect of the provision
rendering such carrier liable for acts of the connecting carrier further than
the words of the act and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States have necessitated. The decisions of many of the State courts show
a marked tendency to exclude from the operation of the CARMACK A:MENDMJ;NT all matters not expressly· provided for in it; while the federal courts,
on the other hand, have been inclined to make the amendment as a whole
all-inclusive, and to extend its application broadly and freely. For example,
some State courts, even after ·the Croninger case, held that limitations of
of liability for delay were not within the scope of the CARMACK AMENDMENT
and were governed by State rules, and, similarly, that the initial carrier was
not by that amendment made liable for delay caused by a connecting carrier.
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Nelson, (Tex. Civ. App. 19II), 139 S. W. 81. But
the United States Supreme Court decided that delay in interstate transportation
was covered 1by the amendment. N. Y. & Norfolk R.R. v.PeninsulaExchange,
240 U. S. 34. 36 Sup. Ct. 230. So, as some of the State courts sought to
restrict the effect of the amendment by holding that a contract limiting the
carrier's liability became amenable to State rules when the final carrier
ceased to act as carrier and became a warehouseman, it has been held that
the liability imposed by the amendment upon the initial carrier is terminated as soon as the carrier relation ceases. In Norfolk & W. R. Co. v.
Stuart's Draft Co., 109 Va. 184, the Virginia court declared that "the
vicarious liability sought to be fastened upon the defendant [the initial carrier] is for the acts of the connecting carrier as carrier and not as warehouseman." And other courts have referred to this case with approval.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brewer, 183 Ala. 172, 62 So. 698; Hogan Milling
Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 91 Kans. 783. And in a very recent case the
New York Supreme Court, citing the Stuart's Draft case and others, based
its decision in part upon the proposition that "the initial carrier is not liable
for any breach of duty on the part of the final carrier as warehouseman.''
Dodge & Dent Mfg. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 162 N. Y. Supp. 549.
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In the first cases that came before it involving the CARMACK AMtm>MF:NT,
the United States Supreme Court said that the provision of that amendment
making the initial carrier liable for defaults of connecting carriers operated
to make such connecting carriers the agents of the initial carrier, and intimated that its effect was to apply to all interstate shipments over several lines
the English rule as to through contracts. In Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, the court said: "In substance Congress has said
tQ such carriers: 'If you receive articles for transportation from a point
in one State to a ·place in ".another, you must .do so under a contract to
transport to the place .designated'." And in Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co.
v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, it was said that "under the CARMACK AMF:NDMF:NT,
wherever the carrier voluntarily accepts goods for shipment to a point on
another line in another. State, ·it is conclusively treated as having made
a through contract." And the same conclusion was reached by the Alabama
court in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brewer, supra, in which the court, referring to the C~MACK AMF:NDMF:NT and the English rule, said that "the
true· effect of said am.endment is to bring all interstate shipments, the stipulations of bills of lading to the contrary notwithstanding, under the operation of the rule." . Had the effect of the amendment been no more than to
bring ·ai1 interstate transportation 1ltlder the operation of the English rule
as to through contracts, it might well have been decided that the initial carrier was abs.olved from all further liability as soon as the final carrier ceased
to be a carrier with reference to a particular shipment. It had been held
in Illinois, which is one of the states where the English rule prevails, that
even under that rule the initial carrier was not liable for a mis-delivery by
the· connecting carrier after the latter had ceased to be a carrier and had
become a warehouseman. Illinois Central R. Ca. v. Carter, 165 Ill. 570, 46
N. E. 374 36 L. R A. 527. The lia:bility in England was apparently not so
restricted. Crouch v. Great Western Ry Co., 6 W. R 391. But Congress
went further, and defined "transportation" to include "all services in ·connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation and transfer in transit, ventilation, refrigeration or icing, storage and handling of the property transported;" and it seems, from this definition and the broad language of the
act, that Congress intended by the CARMACK AMF:NDMF:NT to make the initial
carrier liable for any loss, damage, or injury until the interstate shipment
is completed, and that goods shipped are still in interstate commerce, even
though the final carrier has become a warehouseman. So it was held, with
reference to the termination of contracts limiting liability, by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L...Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach,
239 U. S. 588; Southern R. Co. v.. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632; Western Transit
Co. v. Leslie Co . . (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 133. And the Kentucky court, in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Dreyfuss-Weil Co., 150 Ky. 333, 150 S. W. 321,
reached the same conclusion with regard to the termination of the liability
of the initial carrier. It would seem that if the provisions of the original
contract are still in force as against the shipper after the c;arrier relation has
ended, they ought also to continue to be binding on the initial carrier.
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It must be concluded, therefore, that the proposition advanced in Dodge
& Dent Mfg. Co. v. Pemi.sylvania R. R. Co., supra, viz. that the responsibility of the initial carrier is at an end when the final carrier becomes a
warehouseman, cannot be supported as to interstate shipments. And this
conclusion is strengthened by an examination of the authorities cited in
support of it. In Wien v. New York Central & H. R.R. Co., 166 App. Div.
766, the New York court held that the initial carrier was not liable for loss
incurred by the shipper as the result of the connecting carrier's mistake and
failure to return the shipment promptly after the consignee had refused to
accept the goods and the consignor had ordered their return. The decision
was put on the ground that the later negotiations between the consignor and
the final carrier amounted to a new contract, and that the CARMACK AMSNDMSN'l' entitled the shipper to recover from the initial carrier for defaults only
in the performance of the original contract, regarded as a through contract.
Whether or not this decision was correct, it is not authority for the proposition advanced in the principal case, since the question there involved is not
whether the initial carrier is liable for a default by the connecting carrier
in the performance of a new contract made by it, but whether the original
contract was still subsisting. Nor is the decision in the Stuart's Draft case,
supra, and the other cases mentioned above as approving it, authority for
the broad doctrine that the initial carrier is relieved of all further responsibility as soon as the final carrier becomes a warehouseman. However positive the dicta in those cases may be, the decisions themselves involved the
question, not whether the initial carrier was liable at all after the final carrier
had ceased to act as such, but whether it was liable thereafter as a carrier;
in other words, what those cases decided was that the CARMACK AMSNDMSN'l'
did not impose carrier liability on the initial carrier ,for a loss or injury to
goods occurring while they were held by the succeeding carrier as a warehouseman. It has often been held that under that amendment the initial
carrier may make any defense which might be made by the connecting carrier in whose hands the injury occurred. Riverside Mills v. Atlantic Coast
Dine, 168 Fed. g87; Brinson & Kramer v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., l(ig
N. C. 425, 86 S. E. 371; Burke v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 147 N. Y. Supp. 794The natural corollary of that proposition is that where the liability of the
connecting carrier is that of a warehouseman, the liability of the initial carrier is also that of a warehouseman; and it seems obvious that a decision
that the initial carrier is not held to the strict accountability of a carrier
after its agent, the final carrier, has become a warehouseman, is by no means
equivalent to a holding that its re5ponsibility has entirely ceased.
The correct rule, both on principle and authority, seems to be that under
the CARMACK AMSNDMSN'l' the delivering carrier is the agent of the initial
carrier in all matters relating to the delivery of the goods and their preservation or disposition after arrival at destination (Burkenroacl Goldsmith
Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 138 La. 81, 70 So. 44) ; that so long as the relation of
carrier and shipper subsists, whether on its own or connecting lines, the liability of the initial carrier is a carrier liability; and that when the final carrier becomes a warehouseman the responsibility of the initial carrier
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does not cease, but that its liability thereafter is that of a warehouseman only. And these observations apply as well to interstate shipments
made after the Cu?.UIINs A'?o!tNDMtNT of 1915 (38 Stat. at L. ng6) as before, since the provision of the CARMACK AYtNDMtNT applicable to this situation is retained verbatim in the later act.
W. H. S.

lMPAmMtNT OJ! THE 0BuGATION oF CoNTRACT.-The United States Supreme
Court has again indicated its astuteness to hold a decision of a State court
to be a "law impairing the obligation of contracts,'' wherever it can find that
the decision was in fact reached by giving effect to some st,tbsequent legislation. Each of two street railway companies in Detroit was granted the
privilege of occupying additional streets, by ordinances which contained stipulations binding each company to accept a single fare for transportation
"over any of its lines in said city'' and also to sell tickets at a certain reduced ·rate. The plaintiff in error, the Detroit United Railway, acquired and
united under one organization the two street IJilway corporations referred
to above and also certain suburban lines operating under village and township grants, contractual in their nature, but which franchises did not require
that these suburban lines sell tickets at the same rate as was required by the
city of Detroit from those street railways mentioned above, now a part of
the Detroit United Railway system. · Afterwards, by an act of the legislature, the territory in which these suburban lines were operating was annexed
to the City of Detroit, the act providing that the annexed territory should be
subject to all the ordinances and regulations of the city, with exceptions not
now material. It was the contention of the State and of the City of Detroit that
the provisions in .the ordinances, which contained stipulations regarding fares,
and which were assented to by the predecessors of the Detroit United Railway, were intended to be applica:ble throughout the city as it might from time
to time be enlarged, and that the Detroit United Railway, as successor to
these companies, is bound by the limitations of those ordinances as to all
its lines within the city, not only as its limits existed at the time of .Passage
of the ordinances, but also as to the lines it owns in the territory which was
subsequently annexed to the city. The Supreme Court held that the giving of
such effect to the annexation act would amount to an impairment of the
obligation of contract. Detroit United Railway v. People of the State of
Michigan, and Detroit United Railway v. City of Detroit, 37 Sup. Ct. 87.
This decision reversed the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, as
that tribunal had determined the iss~es favorably to the city and State.
People v. Detroit United Railway, 162 Mich. 46o, 139 Am. St. Rep. 582, 125
N. W. 700, 127 N. W. 748; Detroit United Railway v. City of Detroit, 173
Mich. 314 139 N. W. 56.
A consideration of these two Michigan cases discloses that the decisions
were founded upon a construction of the ordinances requiring the predecessors of the Detroit United Railway to charge a single fare for transportation
between any two points on their lines within the city limits. The Mlthigan
court considered that in entering into this contract the parties had home in

NOTE AND COMMENT

431

mind the power of the State to increase or diminish the territory of a city
and that the words "city limits" were used with reference to what the
boundaries of the city might be in the future. This construction is upheld
by St. Louis Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Louis, 46 Mo. 12I; Town of Toiedo
v. Edens, 59 Iowa 352, 13 N. W. 313; McQun.r.IN, MuN. ORDINANCJ;s, §218.
The decision in the two Michigan cases is in harmony with Indiana R. Co. v.
Hoffman, 161 Ind. 593, 6g N. E. 399, and Peterson v. Power Co., 6o Wash.
4o6, III Pac. 338, 140 Am. St. Rep. 936, the facts and questions involved in
these decisions being very similar to the two principal cases.
The contract clause of the Federal constitution is not directed against all
impairment of contract obligation. It does not reach mere errors committed
by a State court when passing upon the validity or effect of a contract under
the laws in existence when it was made. And so, while such errors may
operate to impair the obligation Qf the contract, they do not give rise to a
Federal question. Cross Lake Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 639, 56 L. Ed.
924 32 Sup. Ct. 577, and cases there cited. And on this point the jurisdiction
of the Federal Supreme Court was questioned by respondents in error. However, the court did not consider that the decisions of the State courts turned
upon the mere meaning of the contracts founded upon an acceptance of the
terms of the ordinances; but that the decisions were reached only through
a consideration of the combined effect of those ordinances and the acts of
the legislature of Michigan, which thereafter extended the city limits. And
when the State court, "either expressly or by necessary limitation, gives
effect to a subsequent law of the State whereby the obligation of the contract is alleged to be impaired," a Federal question is presented. In such a
case it becomes our duty to take jurisdiction and to determine the existence
and validity of the contract, what obligations arose from it, and whether
they are impaired by the subsequent law." Cross Lake Club. v. Louisiana,
supra. It has also been lield in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, I Wall. 175,
17 L. Ed. 520, and in many cases which have followed the doctrine set forth
in that case, that if the contract when made was valid by the laws of the
State as then expounded and administered in its courts of justice, its validity
and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent decision of its court.
See WII.I.OUGHBY, CONST., 922.
The pivotal question therefore would seem to be whether or not the
Michigan court's decision, in determining the obligation of the contract, did
give effect to the subsequent act of the legislature. It is apparent that in
determining whether or not the State court has given effect to any subsequent
legislation so as to impair the obligation of the contract, the Federal court
is not bound by the wording of the opinion of the State court, but may
determine for itself whether or not effect was in fact given to subsequent
legislation. "Otherwise, although it was the aim of the suit and effect of
the judgment to give vitality and operation to the subsequent law, and this
court might be of the opinion that there was a valid contract which thereby
would be impaired, it would be powerless to enforce the constitutional guarantee." Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Behrman, 235 U.S. 164, 170. 59 L. Ed.
175, 18o, 35 Sup. Ct. 6z, and cases there cited. .
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The court thereupon went into a consideration of the cases on the merits,
and being unable to accept the construction adopted by the Michigan court
of the ordinances referred to a:bove, it was of the opinion that the decisions
reached by the State court could have been reached only by giving effect to
the subsequent acts of the State legislature which made the annexed
territory subject to the ordinances of the city, and thereby impaired the
obligation of the contracts between the suburban lines and the villages and
townships which granted the franchises. Justice CI.ARKS rendered a dissenting opinion in which Justice BRANDJUS concurred. These justices considered that "the passing of the valid extension act merely created a situation under which the implied condition e:dsting in the fare contract from
beginning, finds an application in the new territory. This is giving effect
not to the terms of the .act of the legislature, but to the terms of the contract with the city, and the most that can be said against the decision of the
Supreme Court of Michigan is that it gives an erroneous construction of
the contract." But this does not give rise to a Federal question within the
rule of Cross Lake Club v. Louisiana, supra.
W. L. 0.

TH:e RIGH'l' 'l'O !U;SCIND S'J.'OCK-D1vm:eNDS ~DY D:ecr.AMIJ.-The rule
that cash dividends, once declared and published, become debts, irrevocable
and absolutely due the shareholder, iS so well-established as to hardly merit
discussion. 7 CooK, CoRPORATIONS, §s41; s TAYLOR, CoRPORA'l'IONs, §568;
MACHSN, MoD:ERN LAW OF CoRPORA'l'IONS, §1358; MoRAw:eTz, CoRPORA'l'IONS,
§445; CLARK & MARsHAI.L, PruvA'l'S CoRPORA'l'IoNs, §s17d. But in the recent
case of Staats v. Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 1916), the same question is raised as to stock dividends.
The corporation was capitalized for $2,000,000 with all but $1,000 of this
stock outstanding, and for over a year there had been a surplus each month
of over $1,000,000 though there was a regular annual dividend of 12%: At
this stage the directors declared and published a scrip dividend of 50% of
the outstanding capital to be paid for in stock or cash at the optio~ of the
directors. Before any scrip was actually issued the European war broke out
and the directors, having well-grounded apprehensions as to the effect of the
war on their business, voted to rescind the dividend. The plaintiff was a
shareholder and sought to collect the dividend on his shares in the present
action. The court affirmed the right of the directors to rescind the dividend
and denied the plaintiff any recovery.
The court recognized the prevailing doctrine as to cash dividends, but excepted stock dividends from the rule. The only authorities cited to support
the distinction were Terry v. Eagle Lo.ck Co., 47 Conn. 141, a dictum in Dock
v. Schlichter Jute Cordage Co., 167 Pa. 370, and MACHSN, MoD:ERN LAW OF
CoRPORA'l'IONs, §6o1. As the Cordage Company case is not in point and
MACHSN cites Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. as his sole authority, we may consider that case alone. Doing so we find that the decision was based squarely
on the laches of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the case seems to be the only
one in which the subject of the present discu"ssion has been raised prior to
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the instant case we will disregard that matter and consider the dicta which
form the exclusive basis for the decision in Staats v. Biograph Co. After
first recognizing the general rule as to cash dividends ·C~N'.l'r:R, J. proceeds to distinguish stock dividends from cash dividends in this relation' on
two grounds: first, the formalities intervening between the declaration of the
dividend and the actual issue of the stock (stating that the whole matter
is in fieri until the stock is actually issued) ; and, secondly, "such dividends
do not materially affect the value of the stock. * * * It does not add to his
(the shareholder's) ready cash, but it changes the form of his investment
by increasing the number of his shares, thereby diminishing the value of each
share, leaving the aggregate value of his stock the same. It is of no special importance whether the value be divided into few or many shares." The
first point is not much dwelt on as it is too readily answered by pointing
out that formalities also intervene before a ·cash dividend can become cash
after it is merely declared, and that saying that it is "in fieri" is begging the
question. Moreover, in Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. it was necessary that the
stock issue ·be authorized by vote of the shareholders, while in the instant
case the directors had authority in themselves to issue stock under the
circumstances. The second ground has been riddled in the cases dealing with
the respective rights of life-tenant and remainderman to the dividends on
stock devised to them. It is the fallacious basis of the so-called "Massachusetts Rule" which, though adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, has been repudiated in practically every
state in the Union where the question has arisen, except Massachusetts,
Illinois, Rhode Island, and: Georgia, the last-named being constrained by
statute. 7 CooK, CoRPORA'l'IoNs, §555· Lord ELDON, in Paris v. Paris, 10 Ves.
185, says : "As to the distinction between stock and money, that is too thin;
and if the law is that this extraordinary profit (50% stock dividend), if
given in the shape of stock shall be considered capital, it must !Je capital if
given as money." The -logical framework of the doctrine quoted from
Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. (which is sedulously followed by the court in the
instant case) has been completely shattered by the masterly opinions of
O'BRn:N, J., in McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N. Y. 179, and MARSHAI.L, J., in Soehnlein v. Soehnlein, 146 Wis. 330, as well as such typical cases as Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368; Ross' Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 264; Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257;
Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545; Pritchitt v. Nashville Trust Co., g6 Tenn.
4721 and People v. Glynn, II4 N. Y. Supp. 46o.
But in Soehnlein v. Soehnlein, sµpra, iMARSHAI.L, J. says: "Little or no
benefit can be derived from an extensive discussion of mere case law. The
better way is to discover the essential principle involved, if that can be done,
and for a rule, trace that principle to a logical result." Refer to the argument quoted from Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. and relied on in the instant case
as the sole basis for making a different rule for stock dividends than for
cash dividends. Is the right to a stock-dividend: a mere "nominal right''?
Why, then, the hundreds of expensive litigations ij:ietween life-tenants and
remaindermen to secure such dividends? Why was the instant suit brought?
Why do our eminent financiers consider it worth while to cut their juicy
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"melons," often without any vestige of surplus, if they be such unsubstantial
fruit? A mere "nominal right'' will hardly occasion such lavish expenditure
of effort and treasure in this work-a-day world! Is it true that when the
stock of a corporation having a capital of $r,ooo,ooo and a surplus of $r,ooo,ooo is increased to $2,000,000 and the additional $r,ooo,ooo in stock distributed
pro rata among its shareholders, that the par value of its shares drops to 50
or the market value from 200 to roo? We all know that is not true. The
par value remains the same; the market value is controlled, as before, by
earning power, value of control and the various currents of the market. The
"nominal value" theory is pure mathematics; it has no place in the world
of reality.
A stock-dividend declared out of surplus is not a mere dilution of stock;
it does not confer a mere nominal right upon the shareholder. It is true that
the property of the corporation is not increased or diminished by such a
dividend. But its liabilities are increased pro tanto, and this liability is to
the existing shareholders. It is a debt to the shareholder to the full extent
that the cash dividend is a debt. The vice in the "nominal value" theory is
that its proponents have identified the corporation and its shareholders in a:
relation where their rights and liabilities are separate, distinct and, to a certain
degree, even inimical.
The instant case was a hard one. for the corporation. The circumstances
warranting the revocation of the dividend as a matter of business policy
were so strong that the court was evidently impressed thereby. But these
considerations of business policy would weigh even more heavily against
the enforeement of a claim for a declared cash dividend. Indeed, the scrip
was to be optional in form and the court allowed the choice of the stockdividend as the least threatening horn of the dilemma, under the rule of
Robinson v. Robinson. We regret that the grounds for this decision were
not more carefully considered.
E. B. H.

